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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Russell Passons was convicted of one count of burglary and two counts of
aggravated assault enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon. In his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Passons asserted that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to
present evidence of his criminal activities the day after the alleged crimes occurred, that
the court erred in denying his motions for mistrial, and that the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial. In this Reply Brief, Mr. Passons addresses some
of the assertions made by the State in its Respondent's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Passions' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in
detail, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing
evidence of Mr. Passons' actions the day after the charged crimes?

2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Passons' motions for mistrial as the jury
hearing he was a repeat offender and a suspect in a robbery deprived him of his
right to a fair trial?

3.

to present

Even if the errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Passons' Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of
errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial? 1

1

The State's Argument regarding Mr. Passons' cumulative error claim is unremarkable
and will not be addressed in this Reply Brief.
2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Present Evidence Of
Mr. Passons' Actions The Day After The Charged Crimes

Mr. Passons was charged with burglary allegedly committed by entering a
Walmart with the intent to steal a television.

He objected to the State presenting

evidence that he attempted to return a baby stroller the next day, and that he fled from
the police after attempting to commit that crime. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Passons
asserted that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his objection to the
State presenting this evidence as it was inadmissible character evidence and that any
relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-20.) He
further asserted that the State would be unable to prove the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-22.)
In response the State asserts, without accompanying analysis, that "the events
leading up to [Mr.] Passons' arrest were circumstantial evidence, inextricably intertwined
with his charged crimes." (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) The State further claims that
Mr. "Passons' attempt to return the stolen stroller, flight from the Ponderay Walmart,
and arrest in Sandpoint, the day after his burglary at the Post Falls Walmart are part of
a single criminal episode, without which a complete account of the charged offense

•

could not be given." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State's argument is simply without
merit.
The parties and the district court were well aware that Mr. Passons was not
charged with any crime related to the theft of the baby stroller. (Tr., p.114, L.12 - p.116,
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the store with the intent

4.) Mr.

1,

steal the stroller, nor was

was not
alleged

to have
have used

the stroller as a means of committing aggravated assault. (R., pp.54-56.) As such, Mr.
Passons' alleged attempt to return the baby stroller he was not charged with stealing,
was not alleged to have intended to steal, and was not alleged to have used as a
means to commit aggravated assault, is simply not relevant to the crimes with which he
charged with committing. The State's mere assertion to the contrary is without merit.
Next, the State relies upon State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339 (Ct. App. 2010), in
support of its argument that this evidence was admissible. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.)
The State's argument is without merit First, unlike the defendant in Brummett, who's
"intent to commit a theft upon his entry into the store was squarely at issue" as the
defendant in that case testified that he formed the intent to steal only after entering the
store, (id. at 341-343), Mr. Passons did not testify at all.

Furthermore, unlike the

defendant in Brummett, who challenged evidence that he committed similar thefts prior
to the crime he was defending against, (id.), Mr. Passons challenges the State's ability
to present evidence that he attempted to return the stroller after he allegedly committed
the burglary charged in the present case. 2 The Brummett Court's analysis is simply
irrelevant to Mr. Passons' case. The State was not required to prove that Mr. Passons
"had a motive or plan ... to steal high-value items and return them for store credit."

(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State had to prove that Mr. Passons had the intent to

2

Mr. Passons does not challenge in this appeal the State's ability to present evidence
that he stole the stroller prior to entering the Walmart the second time.

4

the crime of theft when he re-entered the Post Falls V\/almart
already

he had

the baby stroller.

The State additionally argues that Mr. Passons' flight from police upon attempting
to return the baby stroller that he was not charged with stealing, is evidence of
consciousness of guilt.

(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) While evidence of his flight may

show consciousness of guilt related to Mr. Passons' purported theft of the stroller and
attempt to return the stroller for money, there is simply no evidence that Mr. Passons
fled from the police in order to avoid charges related to the TV set that had been
recovered the prior day.

Thus, Mr. Passons' flight is not relevant to his alleged

consciousness of guilt of the crimes for which he was charged.
Finally, the State argues that Mr. Passons failed to demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion in balancing the probative value of the evidence versus its
prejudicial effect. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) The State's argument is unremarkable
and Mr. Passons relies upon his counter arguments contained in the Appellant's Brief.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.18-20.) However, the State failed to make any harmless error
argument. (See, GENERALLY, Respondent's Brief.) Thus, the State has waived any
opportunity to assert the district court's error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 548, 598-599 (2013).

11.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Passons' Motions For Mistrial As The Jury
Hearing He Was A Repeat Offender And A Suspect In A Robbery Deprived Him Of His
14th Amendment Right To A Fair Trial

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Passons asserted that the district court erred when it
denied each of his motions for mistrial, based first upon a potential juror's statement that

5

had

in and out of jail more times than I can count," which was

'-''-''J'"''"'

upon her

of the number and type of tattoos he had, and then upon a police officer
volunteering that Mr. Passons was a suspect in a robbery. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-26.)
He further asserted that, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, these statements
allowed the jurors to convict him based upon their perception that he is a person of ill
character, rather than upon the evidence presented; thus, Mr. Passons asserted that he
was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.)
In response, the State largely relies upon the unremarkable proposition that
jurors are generally presumed to be impartial and to follow jury instructions, and thus,
the State argues that Mr. Passons failed to show the district court erred in denying his
motion for a mistrial.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-16.) Mr. Passons, however, asserts

that while the jurors may not have been personally biased against him, by denying his
motions for mistrial, the district court in essence allowed the jury to evaluate the
evidence presented in the context of the negative information about Mr. Passons'
character with which they were presented.
After hearing Ms. Cook's explanation that she believed Mr. Passons had been "in
and out of jail more than I can count" based upon the number and type of tattoos that
Mr. Passons had (Tr. p.16, L.13 - p.20, L.10), the district court recognized that
Mr. Passons has "a rather large star tattoo on ... on the upper right side of his
forehead," and visible tattoos on his neck underneath his chin and on his hands that
would have been visible to the juror.

(Tr., p.82, L.17 - p.83, L.14.) The Court also

recognized that, rather than merely expressing an opinion that Mr. Passons must be
guilty merely because he is charged with a crime or expressing a negative opinion
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about people who

Cook described Mr. Passons' tattoos as

in

being a result of his repeated prior incarcerations.

(Tr., p.83, L.19

p.84, L.13.)

However, the court never instructed the jury to disregard Ms. Cook's recognition that
Mr. Passons had been "in and out of jail" many times. Therefore, although Ms. Cook's
statements were not admitted as evidence, her statements presented information that
Mr. Passons had been repeatedly incarcerated and were not corrected by the district
court.
Additionally, after Officer Heberer testified that, "[w]e were following a suspect
from a robbery that occurred --" (R., p.234, Ls.19-20), the district court instructed the
jury as follows:
I want to instruct you that there was no robbery. There has been no
robbery charged, nor is Mr. Passons a suspect in a robbery at the relevant
time in question here. So I just want to make sure the jury is very well
aware of that.
(Tr., p.242, Ls.3-7.) Had the jury not heard any evidence about Mr. Passons allegedly
attempting to return the stolen stroller, the district court's instruction may have been
sufficient to ameliorate the prejudicial impact of Officer Heberer's statement. However,
when combined with Ms. Cook's interpretation of the tattoos that all of the jurors could
see, Officer Heberer's testimony that Mr. Passons was the subject of a robbery
investigation, and the court's instruction that Mr. Passons was not "a suspect at the

relevant time in question here," the jurors were lead to the conclusion that Mr. Passons
was a repeat offender who has been a suspect in a robbery at some point, and is
generally a person of ill character. Therefore, in light of the entire record, the district
court erred in denying Mr. Passons' motions for a mistrial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr.

respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and

remand his case to the district court for a new trial.

DATED this 6th day of August, 201

C. PINTLER
State Appellate Public Defender
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